During the period, press freedom remained subject to a system of structural censorship and systematic persecution of independent journalism. The decline in physical assaults in public spaces does not reflect an improvement in protection, but rather the near disappearance of on-the-ground journalism inside the country, where those who continue to report must do so clandestinely or under constant surveillance.
Since 2018, more than 300 journalists and media workers have gone into exile, while in 2025 alone at least 58 media workers left the profession due to economic hardship, unemployment, the closure of news outlets, and the risk of repression. As a result, the Foundation for Freedom of Expression and Democracy (FLED) identifies 11 departments—65% of the national territory—as “information blackout zones,” although the efforts of media outlets and journalists in exile continue to keep the population informed. The country currently has no print newspapers in circulation.
With the near disappearance of street journalism, state pressure has shifted toward the digital sphere and administrative and legal mechanisms. In April, the government, through the National University of Engineering (UNI), removed the .com.ni domains of media outlets such as La Prensa, Onda Local, and 100% Noticias. In May, the Nicaraguan Institute of Telecommunications and Postal Services (TELCOR) ordered the closure of Radio Stereo Romance and confiscated its equipment, citing technical violations. FLED recorded 28 digital attacks between April and June 2025—70% of the cases documented during that period—and 44 during the first quarter of 2026. These actions include defamation campaigns, the disclosure of personal information (doxxing), and threats against journalists and their families, carried out by networks of trolls and profiles aligned with the governing party.
The legal framework continues to be used as an instrument of intimidation. The 2024 amendments to the Special Cybercrimes Law (Law 1042) and the Criminal Code introduced ambiguous concepts related to “national security,” “sovereignty,” and “state stability,” allowing restrictions on the dissemination of information deemed unauthorized. In 2026, a constitutional reform was also promoted to elevate to constitutional status restrictions applicable to individuals officially labeled as “coup plotters” or “traitors to the homeland.” This is compounded by the restrictive framework imposed on civil society organizations and international funding, which affects the sustainability of news and information projects.
The right to access public information remains virtually inoperative for independent journalists. Although Law 621 has not incorporated new formal exceptions, in practice access to information held by state institutions is nonexistent. The government’s communications model centralizes official messaging and excludes independent media, while the two existing state-owned media outlets operate as instruments of government propaganda.
The use of judicial restrictions, such as secrecy orders in criminal proceedings, has also increased to prevent coverage of investigations into corruption and other matters of public interest. According to the complaints documented, the judicial system acts in coordination with the Executive Branch to restrict public scrutiny and intimidate sources of information.
The persecution also extends to retired journalists. At least 20 journalists who have left the profession remain under surveillance, with police presence outside their homes and an obligation to report periodically to police stations, where they are questioned and pressured to identify journalists working from inside the country with independent media outlets in exile. FLED has also documented attempts to recruit journalists as state informants. The National Police and other state agents have been identified as primarily responsible for these practices, which include surveillance, restrictions on movement, the seizure of devices, and interrogations.
The combination of persecution, exile, economic hardship, and the closure of media outlets has severely weakened the information ecosystem. Indirect censorship also operates through the discretionary distribution of government advertising, concentrated in media outlets linked to the governing party and the ruling family, while independent media are excluded. This mechanism constitutes a form of indirect censorship contrary to Principle 7 of the Chapultepec Declaration. The unauthorized reproduction of content and restrictions on organizational funding further aggravate the sector’s economic situation.
In this context, Nicaragua lacks a specific and operational state mechanism to protect journalists and media workers. Impunity for attacks and crimes against the press remains critical. The killing of journalist Ángel Gahona, which occurred in April 2018, remains unsolved, with no punishment for those responsible for carrying out or ordering the crime. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and its Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression have warned about the chilling effect of police, judicial, and family-related persecution, which encourages self-censorship even among journalists in exile out of fear of transnational reprisals.
